Naturalism and Moral Realism by Rea, Michael C.
  1 
 
 
NATURALISM AND MORAL REALISM† 
MICHAEL C. REA 
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME 
 
My goal in this paper is to show that naturalists cannot reasonably endorse moral realism. 
In defending this conclusion, I mean to contribute to a broader anti-naturalistic project. 
Elsewhere (Rea 1998, 2002), I have argued that naturalists must give up realism about material 
objects, materialism, and perhaps even realism about other minds. Materialism aside, I take 
realism about material objects and realism about other minds to be important parts of our 
commonsense metaphysics. Likewise, I take moral realism to be an important part of 
commonsense morality. Insofar as it conflicts with these important parts of our commonsense 
view of the world, naturalism is unattractive. Of course, one might doubt that unattractiveness 
counts as evidence against a philosophical position; but, as I’ll explain below, I think that 
naturalism is not a philosophical position, but a research program. Moreover, I have argued 
elsewhere (Rea 2002) that naturalism, like any other research program, must be adopted or 
rejected solely on the basis of its pragmatic appeal (or lack thereof).  It is for this reason that 
highlighting unattractive features of naturalism is an important way of attacking it. 
 Moral realism is the view that there are objective moral facts.1 There are objective moral 
facts only if the following two conditions are met: (i) there are moral properties—e.g., properties 
like being a right action, being a wrong action, being praiseworthy, being depraved, and so on—
at least some of which are exemplified by actual objects or events, and (ii) the exemplification of 
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a moral property p does not entail that anyone has beliefs about what exemplifies p, about 
whether p is exemplified at all, or about the conditions under which p is exemplified. Condition 
(ii) is meant to express part, but only part, of what many philosophers aim to express by phrases 
like ‘moral properties are not mind-dependent’ or ‘moral facts are not theory-dependent’.2  
Some naturalists already accept the conclusion that I want to defend here, but many 
continue to resist it. For reasons that will become clear below, those who resist have typically 
done so by arguing for one of the following claims:  
(C1) Regardless of whether they are reducible to non-moral properties, objective moral 
properties play an indispensable role in the best causal explanations of at least 
some natural phenomena (e.g., moral beliefs and judgments, or morally 
significant behavior). 
 (C2) Moral properties are reducib le to non-moral properties which, in turn, play an 
indispensable role in the best causal explanations of various natural phenomena. 
Part of what I aim to show is that, contrary to widespread opinion, neither of these claims offers 
any promising line of resistance against the conclusion I’ll be defending.   
 My argument will come in two parts. The first part aims to show that any plausible and 
naturalistically acceptable argument in favor of belief in objective moral properties will appeal in 
part to simplicity considerations (broadly construed)—and this regardless of whether moral 
properties are reducible to non-moral properties. By ‘simplicity considerations (broadly 
construed)’ I mean just those considerations that reflect our preference, ceteris paribus, for 
theories that are elegant, ontologically economical, mathematically simple, and consistent with 
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our considered judgments, theoretical commitments, and other entrenched background 
presuppositions.3 (Such considerations are often referred to as ‘pragmatic’ considerations; but I 
avoid that label because I do not want to presuppose that they are merely pragmatic and thus not 
indicative of truth.) Henceforth, I will speak of an appeal to such considerations just as an 
“appeal to simplicity”.   
The second part argues for the conclusion that appeals to simplicity justify belief in moral 
properties only if either those properties are not objective or something like theism is true. Thus, 
if my argument is sound, naturalists can reasonably accept moral realism only if they are 
prepared to accept something like theism. But, as will become clear, naturalists can reasonably 
accept theism or something like it only if belief in some such doctrine is justified by the methods 
of science. For present purposes, I’ll assume (what I think virtually every naturalist will grant) 
that belief in theism and relevantly similar doctrines is not justified by the methods of science. 
Thus, I will conclude that naturalists cannot reasonably accept moral realism. Before presenting 
the details of the argument, however, I’ll first say a few words about the nature of naturalism. 
 
1. Naturalism 
As I understand it, naturalism is not a view, or a philosophical thesis, but a research 
program. A research program is a set of methodological dispositions—dispositions to trust 
particular cognitive faculties as sources of evidence and to treat particular kinds of experiences 
and arguments as evidence. Naturalism, so I say, is a research program that treats the methods of 
science, and those methods alone, as basic sources of evidence (where a putative source of 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Thus, conditions (i) and (ii) provide necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for objectivity. To get in the 
neighborhood of a sufficient condition, we would have to add that the exemplification of a moral property p is in 
some relevant sense independent of actual human desires and attitudes. 
  4 
evidence is treated as basic just in case it is trusted in the absence of evidence in favor of its 
reliability). 
In characterizing naturalism this way, I put myself at odds with many philosophers—
naturalists and non-naturalists alike. But the philosophers with whom I am at odds are not at all 
unified in their views about what naturalism is. Some say that naturalism is primarily a 
metaphysical view (for example, the view that the universe is a closed causal system).4 Others 
say that it is primarily an epistemological view (for example, the view that scientific inquiry is 
the only avenue to knowledge).5 Still others say that it is primarily a view about philosophical 
methodology (for example, the view that philosophers ought to abandon traditional problems 
about skepticism and ontology and pursue their various projects in a way continuous with the 
methods of science).6  Most naturalists would affirm Wilfrid Sellars’s slogan that “science is the 
measure of all things: of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not” (Sellars 1963: 173); 
and many, no doubt, would say that this slogan captures the heart and soul of naturalism. But 
apart from that, there is little agreement about what, precisely, naturalism amounts to. 
It is tempting, in light of the proliferation of different and conflicting formulations of 
naturalism, to say that naturalism comes in different varieties, each expressible by a different 
philosophical thesis. Those who give in to this temptation typically list three varieties—
metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological—though once in a while other varieties are 
identified.7 Different philosophers are then labeled not simply as naturalists but as metaphysical, 
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4 See, e.g., Armstrong 1980: 35 and Danto 1967: 448. 
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epistemological, or methodological naturalists, depending on which of the relevant theses they 
seem to endorse.   
But this is not the only way of accounting for the diversity of formulations of naturalism. 
Another possibility is that there is indeed only one version of naturalism, but many 
mischaracterizations of it. Given the current state of the literature, to embrace this possibility is 
to say that many naturalists have mischaracterized their own naturalism. Saying this might seem 
uncharitable. It might also seem implausible. Nevertheless, I think that there are very good 
reasons for doing so.  
 Despite all the disagreement about how to formulate naturalism, almost every naturalist 
agrees that naturalism somehow involves deep respect for the methods of science above all other 
forms of inquiry. To the extent that one fails to manifest a disposition to follow science wherever 
it leads, one fails to count as a naturalist. But if we take this idea seriously, then we are led fairly 
directly to the conclusion that naturalism couldn’t be a substantive philosophical thesis. For 
naturalists will agree that any substantive thesis that we might plausibly identify with naturalism 
is itself at the mercy of science. That is, any such thesis must be justified by the methods of 
science, if at all; and any such thesis can, at least in principle, be overthrown by scientific 
investigation. But no one seems to think that naturalism itself would be refuted if science were to 
produce evidence against some favored thesis of (e.g.) metaphysics, epistemology, methodology, 
or semantics. Again, the heart of naturalism is to follow science wherever it leads; but, clearly 
enough, one cannot be a naturalist and be disposed to follow science wherever it leads if 
naturalism itself is inextricably tied to some thesis that science might overthrow. To suppose that 
naturalism involves dogmatic adherence to a substantive philosophical thesis is, therefore, either 
to suppose that naturalists one and all have fallen into a rather elementary and uninteresting sort 
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of incoherence or to suppose that, appearances to the contrary, naturalists are not really unified 
by a disposition to follow science wherever it leads. But neither of these alternatives seems 
plausible. Thus, in my view, it is much better (and, ultimately, more charitable) to say that 
naturalism is not a thesis, but something else.   
 I suppose there are many other things naturalism could be: an attitude, a value, a 
preference, etc. However, in light of what the most prominent 20th century naturalists have said 
about it, my own view is that naturalism is best characterized as a research program. Taking it 
this way fits very nicely with the characterizations (slogans aside) offered by its most prominent 
spokesmen in the 20th Century—John Dewey and W. V. Quine. Moreover, it faithfully captures 
what is common to virtually all of those who call themselves naturalists without falling prey to 
the problem (briefly described above) that besets any attempt to express naturalism as a thesis. 
As I see it, then, what unifies naturalists is not adherence to a philosophical position, but rather a 
disposition to conduct inquiry in a certain way—a way dominated by the methods of science.8  
 What are the methods of science?  Notoriously, it is hard to say exactly what they are.  
But we can say very roughly that the methods of science are, at present anyway, those methods 
(including canons of good argument, criteria for theory choice, and the like) that are regularly 
employed and respected in contemporary university science departments (e.g., departments of 
biology, chemistry, geology, physics, etc.). Reliance on memory and testimony is surely included 
among these methods, as are judgments about apparent mathematical, logical, and conceptual 
truths. Ruled out, on the other hand, are evidential appeals to ungrounded hunches, rational 
intuitions (conscious episodes in which a proposition seems to be necessarily true), putative 
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divine revelations or religious experiences, manifestly unreliable sources of testimony, and the 
like.9 Again, this characterization is rough; but it will do well enough for present purposes. 
  
2. Science and Morality 
 In light of the characterization of naturalism just given, it should be clear that a 
naturalistically respectable argument for any conclusion will be one that appeals only to premises 
that can be known by way of the methods of science. In this section, I will argue that any 
naturalistically respectable argument for belief in objective moral properties will have to appeal 
to simplicity.  
I’ll take as my point of departure Gilbert Harman’s well-known argument for the general 
conclusion that moral realism is untenable. In short, Harman rejects moral realism on the 
grounds that objective moral facts have no role to play in our best causal explanations of natural 
phenomena. In response to his argument, those interested in defending both naturalism and moral 
realism have typically defended either C1 or C2:  
(C1) Regardless of whether they are reducible to non-moral properties, objective moral 
properties play an indispensable role in the best causal explanations of at least 
some natural phenomena (e.g., moral beliefs and judgments, or morally 
significant behavior). 
 (C2) Moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties which, in turn, play an 
indispensable role in the best causal explanations of various natural phenomena. 
                                                 
9But here we must add a caveat. Though it is surely right to say that rational intuition isn’t generally treated as a 
source of evidence in science, there might be a case to be made for the conclusion that it is treated as a source of 
evidence in the ill-defined domain of mathematical, logical and conceptual truths. (See Rea 2002: 67, 199 – 210 for 
further discussion.)  But even if this is right, it does not affect the present discussion; for moral truths clearly aren’t 
mathematical or logical truths, and the phenomenon of widespread intractable disagreement is just one among 
several convincing pieces of evidence that they aren’t sufficiently similar to paradigm cases of conceptual truths 
(e.g., ‘All bachelors are male’) to be treated as such. 
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Indeed, as I’ll make clear below, there seems to be no naturalistically respectable way of 
resisting Harman’s argument apart from defending C1 or C2. But I’ll also argue that, if this is 
right, then even if C1 or C2 can be successfully defended, any naturalistic argument for belief in 
objective moral properties will have to make some appeal to simplicity.  
 
2.1. Harman’s Argument 
In the opening chapters of The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman argues that ethics is 
problematic because it appears that “there can be no explanatory chain between moral principles 
and particular observings in the way that there can be such a chain between scientific principles 
and particular observings.” (1977: 9) The “particular observings” for which moral facts are 
candidate explanations are just moral observations. For example, Harman points out that if we 
see some young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, we do not need to conclude that 
their behavior is wrong; we can see that it is an instance of wrong behavior just as clearly as we 
can see that it is an instance of cat-burning behavior. (1977: 4) But, he argues, moral facts have 
no role to play in explaining this sort of observation. More exactly: they have no role to play in 
the best causal explanation of this sort of observation (or of anything else). As he makes clear 
elsewhere (Harman 1984: 33 - 4; Harman 1986: 61 – 4) the point isn’t that moral facts are never 
invoked in an explanatory way. The point, rather, is that the fact that the behavior of the cat-
burning hoodlums is wrong, the fact that the hoodlums are depraved, and other such moral facts 
seem not to figure in any causal explanations of anything. Thus, Harman can grant that it makes 
perfect sense to say (e.g.) that we are repulsed by the behavior of the cat-burning hoodlums 
because the behavior is wrong, and that the children are behaving in that way because they are 
depraved. The point is just that the wrongness of their behavior does not cause our observation 
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that the behavior is wrong, nor does it cause our repulsion at that behavior; and the depravity of 
their character does not cause the hoodlums to burn the cat.10 All of these events have perfectly 
natural, non-moral causes, and  it is those causes, rather than any alleged moral facts, that seem to 
figure in the best (causal) explanations of their effects. But if that’s right, Harman thinks, then, 
absent a reduction of moral facts to non-moral ones, we have no scientific reason—and hence, 
on his view, no reason at all—to believe in moral facts. 
Officially, Harman’s argument thus far is directed against belief in irreducible moral 
facts. He also expresses reservations about the possibility of offering a plausible and sufficiently 
detailed naturalistic reduction of moral facts. But it is clear from his presentation that his 
objections against belief in irreducible moral facts, as well has his reservations about the 
possibility of reducing moral facts to non-moral facts, apply equally to belief in objective moral 
properties and to the possibility of reducing such properties to non-moral ones. Thus, I will 
henceforth talk about Harman’s argument and responses to it as if what is at issue is belief in 
objective moral properties rather than belief in moral facts. Also, unless otherwise indicated, I 
will use the term ‘moral properties’ unqualified as shorthand for the term ‘objective moral 
properties’. 
I have already mentioned two ways of replying to Harman’s argument: defend C1 or 
defend C2. Before discussing those replies, however, I want first to identify and set aside two 
other ways of replying.  As I understand it, Harman’s argument rests on four premises:   
(P1)  Irreducible moral properties have no (indispensable) role to play in our best causal 
explanations of any natural phenomena. 
                                                 
10 Note that ‘x because y’ isn’t equivalent to, and does not entail ‘x is a cause of y’.  We might say ‘The vase broke 
because it was fragile’; but in saying this we don’t commit ourselves to the claim that the fragility of the vase caused 
its breaking. 
  10 
(P2) Moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties that play indispensable 
roles in our best causal explanations of natural phenomena. 
(P3) Scientific justification proceeds by way of inference to the best (causal) 
explanation.  
(P4) If there is no scientific justification for believing in xs, then there is no 
justification at all for believing in xs. 
C1 and C2 are attacks on P1 and P2 respectively. But one might also resist the argument by 
attacking either P3 or P4. Attacking P4 is unacceptable from a naturalistic point of view, 
however—not because science couldn’t provide reason for rejecting P4, but because (as far as 
we know) science hasn’t offered reason to reject P4.11 Thus, short of defending C1 or C2, the 
only other avenue of reply is to attack P3. 
For the most part, P3 has gone unquestioned in the literature;12 and the importance of C1 
in the moral realism debate is powerful testimony to the fact that naturalists, in general, have 
been prepared to accept it. P3 is not beyond question, of course. But I doubt that there are 
alternatives that stand a better chance of being compatible with both naturalism and realism 
about the entities posited in scientific theories. Bas van Fraassen (1989), for example, is a well-
known critic of inference to the best explanation, but his own conception of scientific 
justification is explicitly anti-realist. Likewise, Richard Boyd (1988) urges the conclusion 
(superficially contrary to what philosophers like Harman seem to think) that the method of 
reflective equilibrium is the method of science. But Boyd does not deny that the method of 
reflective equilibrium as he understands it is equivalent to what Harman would call “the 
inference to the best explanation”, and a look at Harman’s explicit account of inference to the 
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sources of evidence (e.g., clairvoyance, rational intuition, etc.). 
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best explanation bears out the equivalence. (Cf. Harman 1965) Moreover, Boyd (1982, 1988) 
concedes what will be crucial for my point later on—namely, that by employing the method of 
reflective equilibrium as a method of theory choice, we inevitably choose theories in part on the 
basis of simplicity considerations.13 This fact is all that I aim to establish by assuming with 
Harman that scientific justification proceeds by way of inference to the best exp lanation. 14 But it 
is, I think, a fact that will be as easily established under any other plausible assumption (like 
Boyd’s) about the process of scientific justification that purports to be compatible with scientific 
realism.   
Granting P3 and P4, the only way to resist Harman’s argument is to endorse either C1 or 
C2. As it happens, I think that both C1 and C2 are false; but in the remainder of this section my 
main concern will simply be to show that, even if one or the other is true, naturalistic arguments 
in support of moral realism must ultimately rest on an appeal to simplicity. 
 
2.2. Inference to the Best Explanation 
 According to C1, objective moral properties play an indispensable role in the best causal 
explanations of at least some natural phenomena, and this regardless of whether they are 
reducible to non-moral properties. Plausible examples in support of C1 are hard to find; but three 
seem especially worthy of attention. First, one might note that we often regard the moral 
judgment of others as being more or less reliable than our own. But, one might think, one’s 
moral judgment can be reliable only if the presence or absence of moral properties at least partly 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 For the most part, but not entirely.  See, e.g., Sayre -McCord 1988b. 
13 As I’ll note in Section 3, Boyd understands the notion of simplicity in a way different from the way I am 
understanding it here. But I’ll also argue that understanding simplicity in his way won’t help a naturalist to avoid the 
conclusion that I am defending.  
14 I also assume that, so far as scientific justification is concerned, there is no distinction to be drawn between 
inference to the best explanation and inference to the best causal explanation.  Hence, I’ll drop the qualifier here 
and, for the most part, in what follows. 
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causally explains one’s moral beliefs. (Sturgeon 1986: 71-2; Adams 1999: 67-8) Second, one  
might note that we’re inclined to believe that, say, moral depravity leads people to do terrible 
things, or that moral decency keeps people from doing such things. But this too might seem to 
make sense only if moral properties enter into causal explanations. (Sturgeon 1986: 74-5)  Third, 
one might think that “certain regularities—for instance, honesty’s engendering trust or justice’s 
commanding allegiance, or kindness’s encouraging friendship—are real regularities that are 
unidentifiable and inexplicable except by appeal to moral properties.” (Sayre-McCord 1988b: 
276) Here too, then, we might seem to have a case of moral properties playing a role in causal 
explanations.  
My own view is that naturalists should not put much stock in examples like these. Kurt 
Gödel’s mathematical sensibilities were more reliable than my own; and both Fermat’s Last 
Theorem and Goldbach’s Conjecture have kept many a mathematician up late at night. Does it 
follow from any of this that mathematical propositions or properties enter into causal 
explanations? Ironically enough, Harman would probably concede that mathematical 
propositions and properties do enter into causal explanations, but that is only because they play 
an indispensable role in the sorts of causal explanations that constitute our best physical theories. 
It is emphatically not because they must be invoked as causes either of mathematical beliefs or 
of insomnia. As Harman points out, however, moral propositions do not enter into physical 
theory, or any other scientific theory, in the way that mathematical propositions do. And I think 
that there is no more reason to think that they must be (or even can be) invoked as causes of 
moral beliefs or morally significant behavior than there is to think that mathematical properties 
or propositions can be invoked as causes of mathematical beliefs or of insomnia. Of course, if 
Sayre-McCord is right in thinking that there are at least some regularities in the world that are 
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“unidentifiable and inexplicable” apart from an appeal to moral properties, then there is reason to 
think that moral properties enter into our best causal explanations of natural phenomena. But I 
see no naturalistically acceptable reason for thinking that Sayre-McCord’s claim is true.  
Consider his first example: honesty’s engendering trust. The clear, empirically detectable 
regularity here is a connection between a certain kind of truth-telling disposition and various 
other dispositions to believe and act on the things that are said by people with the first 
disposition. But why think that this regularity can’t be identified or explained apart from an 
appeal to moral properties? Similar remarks apply to the other examples on Sayre-McCord’s list.  
I needn’t press this point, however. For, as I will now argue, there’s good reason to think 
that, regardless of whether C1 is true, any scientific justification we might have for belief in 
objective moral properties will depend on an appeal to simplicity. As Section 3 will make clear, 
this is all that is required to show that naturalists cannot accommodate belief in objective moral 
properties. 
Suppose, as we have been, that scientific justification proceeds by way of inference to the 
best explanation. There are, very roughly speaking, two ways in which we can be justified by an 
inference to the best explanation in believing that properties of a certain kind are exemplified. 
The properties in question might be among the explainers, explicitly posited as salient causes of 
particular empirical phenomena. Or their existence might be implied by background 
presuppositions which are part of the theory because of their simplifying role (i.e., their presence 
in the theory helps to make it more elegant, more ontologically economical, less mathematically 
complicated, or more consistent with our considered judgments, theoretical commitments, or 
other entrenched presuppositions). I do not mean to suggest that there is any sharp distinction to 
be drawn between explanatory posits and background assumptions. But there is at least an 
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intuitive, rough-and-ready distinction here that is worth attending to. So, for example, if belief in 
the fundamental, causally efficacious properties of protons is justified by an inference to the best 
explanation, it is so because those properties are posited by our best explanations of various 
empirical phenomena as causes of those phenomena. On the other hand, if belief in the kind-
property being a proton is justified by an inference to the best explanation, it probably is so not 
because that property too is posited as a cause of various empirical phenomena, but rather 
because our theories are simplified by framing them in terms of an ontology that includes protons 
rather than, say, in terms of an ontology that includes only mere bundles of the more 
fundamental properties, or aggregates of instantaneous proton-stages, or something else 
empirically but not metaphysically equivalent. I say this because, plausibly, there is nothing that 
would be causally explained by the property being a proton that isn’t already causally explained 
by the more fundamental, intrinsic, non-sortal properties of protons. Likewise, I think, with 
properties like being a material object, being an enduring particular, and being an intrinsic 
modal property. Such properties are either causally inert or causally redundant.  Thus, whatever 
scientific justification we have for believing in them would seem to come from the simplifying 
role they play in our theories, since whatever causally explanatory roles they might be thought to 
play are either spurious or else already being played by other, more fundamental properties.  
Now, it is hard to take seriously the idea that moral properties are explanatory posits. 
That is, it is hard to take seriously the thought that our main reason for believing in moral 
properties is that our best scientific theories posit them as the salient explanatory causes of 
particular empirical phenomena. As we have seen, some do claim that moral properties are 
causally efficacious and that they play a role in our best explanations of natural phenomena. But 
no naturalist seems seriously to think that the explanations in question invoke moral properties to 
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explain phenomena that are otherwise causally unexplained. To whatever extent moral properties 
are causally efficacious at all, from a naturalistic point of view they are either reducible to non-
moral properties or else irreducible but causally redundant. In either case, all of the relevant 
explanatory work is already done by non-moral properties. Thus, there is no need to posit 
distinctively moral properties for explanatory purposes. So if belief in moral properties is 
justified by an inference to the best explanation, this must be because our theories are somehow 
simplified by framing them in terms of an ontology that includes moral properties rather in terms 
of one that doesn’t.  
Further evidence for this comes from the fact that none of the major defenders of the 
explanatory value of moral properties attempts to defend the claim that moral properties are 
explanatory posits. Nicholas Sturgeon (1985, 1986), for example, makes it his strategy to assume 
that there are moral properties and then to show that, on that assumption, such properties have a 
role to play in our explanations of various phenomena. Thus, rather than attempt to show that 
moral properties must be posited to explain various phenomena, he only aims to show that 
explanatory roles can be found for moral properties if we take for granted (presumably for other 
reasons) that there are such properties. Boyd (1988), Jackson (1998), Jackson & Pettit (1995), 
Railton (1986), and Sayre-McCord (1988b) among others all take similar strategies. And this is 
precisely the strategy we should expect to find naturalistic proponents of C1 taking if, as I have 
argued, whatever scientific justification we have for belief in moral properties comes from the 
simplifying role of such belief. 
There is another reason for thinking that if belief in moral properties is justified by an 
inference to the best explanation then it is justified in part on pragmatic grounds. It is widely 
believed that, in science, what counts as the best explanation of some phenomenon is determined 
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in large part by what I have called simplicity considerations, broadly construed.15 I will not 
attempt to defend this view here; but if it is true, then it follows directly that, if belief in moral 
properties is justified by an inference to the best explanation, it’s justification depends ultimately 
upon an appeal to simplicity.  
 
2.3. The Irrelevance of Reducibility 
According to C2, moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties that figure in our 
best causal explanations of natural phenomena. I take it that, in the context of the moral realism 
debate, the project of reducing moral properties to non-moral properties is just the rather broad 
project of trying to show how moral properties might be identical with or in some sense 
composed of properties that are quantified over in paradigmatically scientific theories. (Thus, 
there is no reason to suppose that a reduction would have to provide “bridge principles” 
explicitly identifying specific properties mentioned in existing moral theories with specific 
properties mentioned in existing physical, chemical, or biological theories.) In the remainder of 
this section, I will argue that even if objective moral properties are reducible to non-moral 
properties, naturalists still must appeal to simplicity in order to justify belief in such properties. If 
I am right, then establishing the reducibility of moral properties to non-moral properties is of no 
use to a naturalist hoping to resist the overall conclusion of this paper. 
The basic problem is just this: Demonstrating reducibility is not the same as 
demonstrating the truth of a particular reduction. Plausibly, one can demonstrate reducibility 
simply by showing that if we take moral realism for granted, and if we take for granted various 
assumptions about what non-moral properties are objectively good or bad, or about what non-
                                                 
15 Cf. Koons 2000, Lipton 1991, and Swinburne 2001 (Ch. 4).  Koons 2000 argues that, because simplicity 
considerations play such an important role in scientific justification, naturalists cannot accommodate scientific 
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moral states of affairs are objectively rational to promote or to avoid, then moral properties will 
be identical with or composed of the members of a certain class of non-moral properties. 
Demonstrating the truth of a particular reduction, however, requires one to demonstrate, in 
addition, the truth of moral realism and the correctness of one’s various assumptions about what 
non-moral properties are objectively good or bad and about what non-moral states of affairs are 
objectively rational to promote or to avoid. Thus, even if we are presented with a perfectly 
compelling argument for the conclusion that objective moral properties are reducible to non-
moral properties, we are still left with the question of why we should believe that there are any 
objective moral properties. And here we are returned to the pair of options sketched in section 
2.2: Assuming we are naturalists, we either posit moral properties as non-redundant causal 
explainers of natural phenomena (an option hardly worth taking seriously) or we presuppose 
their existence as a way of simplifying our theorizing.  
To illustrate this problem, let me briefly sketch one well-known attempt to reduce moral 
properties to non-moral properties. In “Moral Realism” (Railton 1986), Peter Railton argues that 
facts about moral rightness are reducible to facts about what about what an impartial hypothetical 
observer would approve of under conditions of ideal information. These counterfactual facts, in 
turn, are supposed to be reducible to purely descriptive facts about the nature of the society in 
question, it’s particular circumstances, and so on. As a first step into the task, Railton begins by 
showing how the non-moral good of an individual agent can be reduced to facts about what a 
cognitively idealized version of the agent would desire for his or her unidealized self. Crucial to 
his account is the idea of an agent’s objectified subjective interest. Railton introduces that idea as 
follows: 
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 Give to an actual individual A  unqualified cognitive and imaginative powers, and full 
factual and nomological information about his physical and psychological constitution, 
capacities, circumstances, history, and so on.  A will have become A+, who has complete 
and vivid knowledge of himself and his environment, and whose instrumental rationality 
is in no way defective. We now ask A+ to tell us not what he currently wants, but what he 
would want his non- idealized self A to want—or, more generally, to seek—were he to 
find himself in the actual condition and circumstances of A.  
What A+ would want A to want in A’s actual condition and circumstances is what is in A’s 
objectified subjective interest. By way of example, Railton invites us to consider a man who is 
dehydrated in the desert and finds himself desiring a glass of milk. In fact, a glass of water would 
be much better for the man from the point of view of improving his health; and, intuitively, it 
seems that a glass of water is what is objectively in his best interests (assuming, anyway, that he 
wants to survive and be healthy). Railton’s account accommodates this intuition. On the 
assumption that the man desires to survive and be healthy, it turns out that drinking water is in 
the man’s objectified subjective interest, since that is clearly what a cognitively idealized version 
of the man would desire his non-idealized self to desire in the man’s actual condition and 
circumstances of dehydration. What is in a person’s objective interest to do is just what he has an 
objectified subjective interest in doing; and the non-moral good for a person is to do what it is in 
his objective interest to do. Moreover, the fact that it is in a person A’s objective interest to do 
something is supposed to supervene on “those facts about A and his circumstances that A+ 
would combine with his general knowledge in arriving at his views about what he would want to 
want were he to step into A’s shoes.” (174-5) Thus, Railton’s view rightly yields the judgment 
that it is objectively non-morally good for the dehydrated man to drink water even though he 
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actually wants to drink milk; and, plausibly, these facts about the man’s non-moral good 
supervene on purely descriptive, non-normative facts.16 
 From here, the account of moral rightness unfolds roughly as follows. Moral rightness is 
understood as rationality from a social point of view; rationality is understood as the pursuit of 
what it is in one’s objective interests to do; and so social rationality is understood as pursuit of 
whatever is in the objective interests of society. Furthermore, the objective interests of society 
are characterized in a way analogous to the characterization of the objective interests of an 
individual: again, roughly, those interests are whatever would be approved of by an impartial 
observer under conditions of ideal information. Of course, one’s own objective interests might 
not coincide with society’s; but, Railton says, facts about social rationality can still ground ought 
claims that apply to individuals because the social point of view “includes but is not exhausted 
by” the individual’s. (1986: 201) Moreover, these ought claims will satisfy the two conditions I 
identified as necessary for objectivity since they are, in the relevant sense, theory- independent. 
We may note in passing that, even if Railton’s account thus far is true, it is not at all clear 
that it implies that moral facts are genuinely reducible to non-moral facts.17 The reason is that it 
is not clear what non-moral facts are supposed to determine the desire structure of the 
hypothetical observer; hence, it is not clear what facts determine the relevant hypothetical 
                                                 
16 Railton’s account of an agent’s non-moral good is similar to the account of normative reasons offered in Smith 
1994.  Smith, however, does not take himself to be offering a fully reductive analysis of normative reasons.  As he 
himself points out, normative concepts are employed in spelling out what it means for S to have a normative reason 
to j. (162) 
17 For the record, I do not believe that Railton’s account thus far is true. The most compelling problem is that his 
account is unable to accommodate the fact that it might be in a person’s objective interest to desire something but 
not to have it. Suppose it is a fact about Kevin that if he were to desire to go to medical school, he would  embark 
upon a course of action that would very probably not result in his actually going to medical school but would result 
in his achieving something else that is very satisfying for himself (perhaps a career as a science teacher or some such 
thing).  Suppose furthermore that if he were actually to go to medical school, he would be absolutely miserable. We 
may assume that Kevin himself does not know these facts, but that Kevin+ would know them.  What then would 
Kevin+ desire to desire were he in the actual condition and circumstance of Kevin? Pretty obviously, he would 
desire to desire to go to medical school. But according to Railton’s account, it does not follow from this that desiring 
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reactions of approval and disapproval. In the case of an individual agent, Railton invites us to 
suppose that the desire structure of the agent’s idealized self depends importantly upon the 
agent’s actual desire structure. And we can see how the dependence would go: take that initial 
desire structure, and then suppose that it remains generally intact in the agent’s idealized self 
except for whatever modifications would be induced by improving the agent’s cognitive abilities 
and information base in the ways suggested. One might reasonably doubt that there are any facts 
about what modifications would be induced in an agent’s desire structure by making the requisite 
cognitive improvements.18 But even if there are such facts, the point is that in the case of social 
rationality, a story analogous to this one about how the hypothetical observer’s desire structure is 
to be determined seems impossible to tell.  We might suppose that the hypothetical observer’s 
desire structure would depend in some way upon the actual goals and desires of individual 
agents; but it is not at all clear how the dependence would go.   
Let us leave this worry aside, however, and let us simply concede that Railton’s account 
has shown us how moral facts might be reducible to non-moral facts. Still, Railton’s account 
crucially depends on the assumption that one in some sense ought to act in accord with social 
rationality and that one ought to do what it is in one’s objective interest (as defined by Railton) to 
do. Granted, we can see why, given a certain set of interests and desires, it would be attractive or 
efficient or useful to act in these ways, and that various tangible benefits would be produced by 
so acting. But Railton’s reduction of non-moral goodness and moral rightness does not justify the 
claim that one objectively ought to pursue one’s non-moral good and that one objectively ought 
                                                                                                                                                             
to go to medical school is in Kevin’s objective interest, which is true; rather, it follows that going to medical school 
is in Kevin’s objective interest, which is false.  
18 As Mark Murphy (1999: 261-265) argues, there is also reas on to doubt (a) whether such modifications would all 
count as improvements in the agent’s desire structure, and (b) whether there’s any good reason to think that the 
hypothetical second-order desires of an agent’s cognitively idealized self are any more authoritative with respect to 
the agent’s well-being than the agent’s actual second-order desires. 
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to do what is morally right. As Railton himself points out, his defense of moral realism 
presupposes a particular understanding of morality and of rationality; and what he has shown is 
that if morality and rationality are to be understood in that way, then objective moral properties 
are reducible to non-moral properties. But what he has not shown (and has not purported to 
show) is that the methods of science do, or even could, reveal that morality and rationality are to 
be understood in the way that he understands them. In other words, Railton has shown, at best, 
that if there are objective moral properties, and if his assumptions about what non-moral states of 
affairs are objectively rational to pursue are correct, then objective moral facts are reducible to 
the sorts of facts he has described.  He has not shown that his reduction is true.  
One might think that we could go some distance toward showing that a particular 
reduction is true if we could show that the reduction in question has correctly identified non-
moral properties (or clusters of properties) that are tracked by our actual use of the terms 
‘morally good’ and ‘morally right’.19 But even if we could show this, we would still not have 
enough to show how belief in objective moral properties is justified. Consider the following two 
premises: 
(1) If there are objective moral properties, and if theory T of the nature of 
morality, rationality, and related notions is correct, then moral properties are 
identical with or composed of natural properties N1 – Nn. 
(2) Our uses of words that allegedly refer to moral properties reliably track N1 – 
Nn. 
                                                 
19 Boyd (1988) presses this point in his own attempt to show that moral properties are reducible to non-moral 
properties. 
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Perhaps some interesting conclusions follow from these premises. But clearly the conclusion that 
there are objective moral properties does not follow from the premises.20 Thus, even if C2 is true, 
and even if it can be shown that a particular reduction has correctly identified natural properties 
tracked by our moral terms, there is still work for a naturalist to do in showing how belief in 
objective moral properties could be justified by the methods of science. And, for precisely the 
reasons laid out in section 2.2, it seems that the only plausible stories to be told here are ones 
according to which belief in moral properties depends for its justification on considerations of 
theoretical simplicity. 
 
3. Pragmatic Arguments 
In Section 2, I argued that any naturalistically respectable argument for belief in objective 
moral properties will have to appeal to simplicity. In this section, I’ll argue that appeals to 
simplicity justify belief in moral properties only if moral properties are not objective or 
something like theism is true.    
Some philosophers make a distinction between pragmatic and epistemic justification. The 
distinction between the two parallels the distinction between pragmatic and epistemic 
rationality—i.e., the distinction between what is rational to do given the goal of furthering one’s 
overall best interests and what is rational to believe in light of one’s evidence given the goal of 
believing in accord with the truth. It is epistemic justification that we’re interested in here. And 
the initially pressing question is whether an argument that invokes considerations of simplicity as 
reasons for belief can provide epistemic justification for its conclusion. 
For reasons I won’t get into here, I’m inclined to think that one is automatically 
epistemically justified in believing things that are sanctioned by sources of evidence that one 
                                                 
20 A somewhat related point is made by Robert Adams (1999: 77-8). 
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treats as basic.21 Insofar as naturalists treat the methods of science as basic sources of evidence, 
and insofar as simplicity considerations are (apparently, anyway) routinely invoked as reasons 
for belief in the natural sciences, I am prepared to assume for the sake of argument that 
naturalists are epistemically justified in believing propositions that are supported by appeals to 
simplicity (especially those that figure in inferences to the best explanation or the method of 
reflective equilibrium). If this assumption is false, then my ultimate conclusion follows directly: 
naturalists are not epistemically justified in believing propositions supported (only) by arguments 
that appeal to simplicity; from a naturalistic point of view, belief in objective moral properties is 
sanctioned (if at all) only by arguments that appeal to simplicity; therefore, naturalists cannot 
reasonably accept commonsense moral realism.22  Thus, the initially pressing question—whether 
one can be epistemically justified in believing something partly on the basis of an appeal to 
simplicity—is resolved by stipulation. 
But once the stipulation is granted, we are committed to thinking that there is some 
connection between simplicity and truth. The reason is that arguments appealing to simplicity 
can yield epistemic justification only if believing propositions on the basis of such arguments is a 
reliable way of believing in accord with the truth. 23 Let us suppose, then, that simplicity is 
somehow a reliable indicator of truth. The pressing question now is: What would be the best 
explanation for this fact?  
One interesting suggestion that I’ll set aside is that our preference for simplicity is just a 
disguised preference for truth. According to Richard Boyd (1980, 1985), for example, what often 
get described as considerations of simplicity are really nothing more than manifestations of a 
                                                 
21 I defend this claim in Chapter 1 of Rea 2002. 
22 I assume that one can reasonably accept only what one is epistemically justified in believing.  But this is just a 
terminological point—a point about how I am here proposing to use the word ‘reasonably’. 
23 Or so I assume. But I acknowledge that the assumption is controversial. 
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preference for theories that are relatively “simple” modifications of existing, evidentially 
supported theories. Thus, given that our existing theories are at least approximately true, the 
preference for simplicity turns out, on this view, to be little more than a preference for 
(approximate) truth.   
There is a lot that is worth exploring in this view, but for now I’ll simply observe that  
adopting it leaves the naturalist no better off with respect to belief in objective moral properties 
than I have so far taken her to be. Suppose we grant that “existing moral theory” (whatever 
exactly that would be) is approximately true. The fact is, this might be so whether or not there 
are objective moral properties, and whether or not existing moral theory quantifies over objective 
moral properties. Now, if Boyd’s understanding of simplicity is correct, then one who believes in 
objective moral properties on the basis of such considerations believes in them either because so 
doing represents a simple modification of an existing theory, or because their existence is already 
implied by an existing theory. In light of the arguments of Section 2, it is hard to see what reason 
a naturalist could ever have for modifying an existing theory so that it quantifies over objective 
moral properties. An appeal to simplicity is ruled out because, on Boyd’s view, that’s not a 
reason for modifying a theory; it’s a reason for preferring one modification rather than another. 
But the point of Section 2 was to show that, from a naturalistic point of view, there aren’t any 
(evidential) considerations apart from simplicity that would lead one to posit objective moral 
properties. Thus, if Boyd’s understand ing of simplicity is right, then if existing moral theory 
quantifies over objective moral properties, it does so for no reason at all, or it does so simply 
because existing moral theory has always quantified over such properties. Thus, if his view is 
right, it looks as if a naturalist’s belief in objective moral properties is either ungrounded or 
grounded simply in the fact that such belief is and always has been prescribed by existing moral 
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theories. But even if we grant that believing something simply because you (or others) always 
have believed it is a reliable way of reaching the truth, nothing in Boyd’s view explains why this 
should be a reliable way of reaching the truth. It’s easy to see how a preference for existing 
theories can reliably lead us to approximate truth, given that those existing theories are already 
approximately true. But it doesn’t help us to see how a preference for existing theories in general 
can lead us to the truth about specific parts of a theory—such as the proposition that there are 
objective moral properties. Thus, it remains a mystery how believing a specific proposition 
simply because you and others have always believed it should be a reliable way of reaching the 
truth. And I take it that the answers to this question will roughly parallel the answers to the more 
general question at issue here—namely, the question of what would explain the fact that 
simplicity considerations as I understand them are generally truth-indicative.  
So what would explain the fact that simplicity is truth-indicative? One possibility is that 
someone or something in the universe is somehow benevolently guaranteeing that it will be. 
This, clearly enough, is in the neighborhood of theism. Another possibility is that a pragmatic 
theory of truth is correct: truth is, roughly, acceptability or assertibility under ideal conditions, 
where “ideal conditions” are spelled out partly in terms of simplicity considerations. A third 
possibility, constructivism, is that we make it the case that our theories are true by 
conceptualizing the world in whatever way we do.24 Thus, so long as we conceptualize the world 
in a way that is empirically adequate (as our scientific theories aim to do) there is no real 
question whether the ontological commitments we thereby incur will be true.25 On this view, 
                                                 
24 Here I am not using the term ‘constructivism’ in the way that Rawls (1980) does. Rather, the view I have in mind 
is primarily a view about ontology, and it  often goes by labels like conventionalism, (global) anti-realism, Kantian 
idealism, and so on (though somewhat different views go by those labels too).  
25 It is, perhaps, tempting to conflate the third possibility with the second. But we can avoid the temptation if we 
attend to the fact that constructivism, insofar as it is coherent, is compatible with deflationism about truth—a 
rejection of more substantive theories of truth in favor of the view that Tarksi’s T-schema says all there is to say 
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simplicity isn’t really an indicator of truth (truth is guaranteed by empirical adequacy); rather, it 
is just a constraint that happen to govern our theorizing.   
It is hard to imagine (plausible) explanations other than these for why simplicity would 
be a reliable indicator of truth. 26 Of course, one can’t infer much from a mere failure of 
imagination. But if, upon reflection, we simply can’t see why theoretical virtues that we take to 
be truth- indicative should be truth- indicative, it is hard to see how we can be justified in 
continuing to treat them as truth- indicative. Thus, assuming it is non-negotiable for naturalists to 
continue treating simplicity as a reliable indicator of truth, and assuming that they (like me) have 
no other plausible story to tell about why it ought to be a reliable indicator of truth, it seems that 
the only reasonable option is to embrace one of the above three alternatives. As a theist, I am 
sympathetic to the first. Moreover, the second (as I shall argue) implies something very much 
like theism. Thus, on the assumption that the methods of science do not by themselves justify 
belief in God, or even something very much like God, naturalists are committed to the third 
alternative. In what follows, I’ll first explain why accepting constructivism commits one to the 
conclusion that moral properties are not objective. I’ll then go on to argue that pragmatic theories 
of truth imply something very much like theism. 
To see why constructivism requires us to give up the objectivity of moral properties, we 
must first get a clearer grasp on what the position amounts to. At first blush, it might seem to be 
incoherent. It is, after all, rather hard to see how we could accomplish the creative feats that 
                                                                                                                                                             
about truth.  For more on constructivism, see Chapter 1 of Rea 2002.  For detailed arguments for the conclusion that 
constructivism does not imply a pragmatic theory of truth, see Alston 1996, Ch. 6. 
26 Koons (2000) discusses a suggestion by David Papineau and Ruth Millikan to the effect that perhaps evolutionary 
processes have “taught” us that there is a correlation between (e.g.) simplicity and truth.  Weinberg (1994) makes a 
similar suggestion. But, as Koons points out, accidental correlation isn’t sufficient for reliable indication.  The laws 
might have been complex; indeed, for all we presently know, the actual laws might (unexpectedly) in fact be 
complex. After all, we don’t yet have the much sought after “final theory”. So even if the Papineau-Millikan-
Weinberg suggestion is true, it remains hard to see what would give us grounds for thinking that virtues like 
simplicity are reliable indicators of truth.    
  27 
constructivism seems to require. How could we make it the case that there are stars, or planets, or 
human organisms simply by theorizing about the world in a way that quantifies over stars, 
planets, and human organisms? More pressingly, how could we—by using our minds—make it 
the case that there are minds? These are serious questions; but I think that constructivists can 
provide answers, and a brief look at those answers will help to clarify the position as I 
understand it. 
The second question can be treated quickly. As I see it, constructivists must simply deny 
that we make it the case that there are minds; thus, they must deny that minds are part of the 
material world that is constructed by our theories.27 If this is right, then constructivists are 
committed to substance dualism. This is surely an interesting (and probably generally 
unwelcome) consequence; but it is not a refutation, and embracing it enables the constructivist to 
avoid the charge of incoherence.   
The first question is more complicated. In response to it, I think that constructivists 
should articulate what many take to be a Kantian view of the world. Roughly, that view is as 
follows. None of the properties that appear to be sortal properties of non-abstract, non-mental 
objects are intrinsic to anything. Properties like being an electron, being a horse, being a star, 
being a human organism, and so on are all extrinsic. Notoriously, it is hard to say exactly how 
such properties could be extrinsic. The most intelligible versions of constructivism typically 
make it clear that the reason they are extrinsic is that whether they are exemplified depends 
importantly upon relations obtaining between our minds and the mind- independent world (i.e., 
whatever thing or things of a wholly unidentifiable sort exist independently of our minds).28 
                                                 
27 I defend this conclusion in detail in Chapter 7 of Rea 2002. 
28 The thing or things belonging to the world as it is in itself must be of an unidentifiable sort because the 
constructivist’s thesis is that all of the sortal properties we are familiar with are extrinsic; but if the thing(s) 
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Moreover, they make it clear that those relations involve, at least in part, our conceiving of the 
world in the ways that we do. But beyond this, it is hard to say exactly what the relevant relations 
consist in. 
Be that as it may, some analogies may help to clarify the position a bit further. Consider 
some other properties that are often, even if not universally, regarded as “being in the eye of the 
beholder”: properties like being a work of art, or being a thing of great beauty.  The 
constructivist might say that, just as the matter in a region of spacetime counts as a work of art or 
a thing of great beauty only if we (or the members of some relevant group) think of it as a work 
of art or a thing of great beauty, so too whether the matter in a region of spacetime counts as a 
star, or a planet, or a human organism, depends upon our thinking of it as a star, or planet, or 
human organism. Likewise, she might say, just as there would be no art, or nothing beautiful, if 
we regarded nothing as art or as beautiful, so too there would be no stars if we regarded nothing 
as a star. There would, of course, still be the stuff that causes our star- like sensations. That stuff 
is part of the mind- independent world.29 But apart from our belief- forming activities, that stuff 
would not constitute a star. 
Even with these analogies on hand, we are still a far cry from having answered all of the 
questions one might have about the intelligibility of constructivism. But we at least have enough 
of a picture to see clearly why moral constructivism is incompatible with commonsense moral 
realism. Quite simply, constructivism implies that goodness, like beauty or art, is in the eye of 
the beholder. Admittedly, matters will probably be a bit more complicated than this. 
Constructivism is, for example, compatible with the view that what’s good is what the members 
                                                                                                                                                             
belonging to the world in itself is (are) to be truly mind-independent, it (they) must have its (their) sortal properties 
intrinsically. 
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of some salient majority take to be good, or what our most pragmatically virtuous theories 
identify as good. But regardless of the details, any constructivist theory will, by its very nature, 
make facts about goodness dependent upon our beliefs about goodness. Thus, a constructivist 
account of goodness will not be an account according to which goodness is a theory- independent 
property; hence, it will not be an account according to which goodness is an objective property; 
hence, it will be incompatible with commonsense moral realism. 
 All that remains, then, is to deliver on my claim that pragmatic theories of truth imply 
something like theism. I have defended this conclusion at length elsewhere (Rea 2000, Rea 
2002), so for present purposes I will only provide a brief sketch.   
 My argument draws its inspiration from Alvin Plantinga’s 1982 Presidential Address to 
the American Philosophical Association. In that address, Plantinga argues that a thesis about 
truth which he attributes to Hilary Putnam implies that, necessarily, there exists an ideally 
rational community. The Putnamian thesis about truth is as follows: 
(HP) Necessarily: p is true º if there were an Ideally Rational Scientific Community 
(IRS) that had all of the relevant evidence, it would accept p. 
In short, Plantinga points out that, by substitution, we can easily obtain HP1: 
(HP1) Necessarily: it is true that there is an IRS º if there were an IRS that had all of the 
relevant evidence, it would accept that there is an IRS. 
But, of course, it is eminently plausible that an IRS possessed of “all the relevant evidence” 
would accept the conclusion that there is an IRS. Thus, HP1 implies the “dismal conclusion” 
that, necessarily, there exists an IRS. 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 Note that ‘stuff’ is not being treated here as a sortal term.  There is, in other words, no object kind (or even a 
particular stuff-kind) that is referred to by the word ‘stuff’.  (If there are stuff-kinds, then stuff is just whatever it is 
that stuff-sortal terms sort.) 
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HP is what we might call an epistemic truth equivalence (or “ETE” for short).  An ETE is 
any claim that asserts that there is a necessary equivalence between what is true and what would 
be believed by a rational agent or community of agents under certain specified conditions. More 
exactly, an ETE is any thesis that conforms to the following schema: 
(E)  Necessarily: p is true º if there were a rational community that satisfied 
condition C with respect to p, then there would be a rational community 
that both satisfies condition C with respect to p and accepts p.  
By ‘rational community’, I just mean ‘a being or group of beings capable of thought and 
reasoning’. ‘Condition C’ refers to what we might call “the acceptance condition”. It is a 
schematic term that takes as substitution instances descriptions of the conditions that must be 
satisfied by a rational community in order for its acceptance of p to be necessary and sufficient 
for the truth of p. The “with respect to p” qualifier is added to take account of the fact that what 
counts as satisfying the acceptance condition might vary from proposition to proposition. Such 
would be the case if, for example, the acceptance condition is satisfied only if the community in 
question possesses all and only the evidence relevant to p. 
The first premise in my argument for the conclusion that pragmatic theories of truth 
imply something like theism is that pragmatic theories of truth entail epistemic truth 
equivalences. Below are some representative examples of claims that might be taken to express 
pragmatic theories of truth: 
 “True ideas are those that we can validate, corroborate, and verify” (James 1907: 
142)  
“The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is 
what we mean by the truth…” (Peirce 1878: 139)  
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 “[T]ruth is an idealization of rational acceptability. We speak as if there were 
such things as epistemically ideal conditions, and we call a statement ‘true’ if it 
would be justified under such conditions.” (Putnam 1981: 55) 
Truth is superassertibility, or “assertibility which would be durable under any 
possible improvement to one’s state of information”. (Wright 1992: 75) 
Pretty obviously, each of these claims taken as a theory of truth is equivalent to a thesis that 
satisfies schema (E). Granted, one might argue (quite convincingly in some cases) that these 
authors did not really mean to be giving a theory about what truth is. But each of these views is 
such that if it were a theory of truth, it would clearly be a pragmatic theory and it would clearly 
imply an ETE. Moreover, I see no way in which a theory of truth could plausibly count as 
pragmatic without implying an ETE; for what makes a theory of truth distinctively pragmatic is 
just its having as a consequence the claim that truth is importantly tied to what is useful (in some 
sense) for humans to believe.  
Of course, there are theses that imply that truth is importantly tied to what is useful for 
humans to believe but tha t do not imply ETE’s. For example: 
(W)  Were P to be appraised under (constructively specified) sufficiently good 
epistemic conditions, P would be true if and only if P would be believed. 
(Wright 2000: 350) 
As Crispin Wright points out, conditionals like W serve to constrain the notion of truth in the 
ways that pragmatists typically want; and, importantly, they do not suffer from many of the 
problems that plague ordinary ETE’s. But, though W-style conditionals surely say something 
interesting and important about truth, they are not theories of truth.  A genuine theory of truth 
will offer or imply, at the very least, a necessary equivalence of the form ‘Necessarily, p is true º 
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_____’.  And, again, it is hard to see how any such equivalence could constitute a pragmatic 
theory of truth without being or entailing an ETE.   
 The second premise in the argument is that every ETE implies something like theism.  To 
establish this conclusion, I need two assumptions. The first is that it is possible that there are no 
contingent beings.  The second is as follows: 
(SC) For any true ETE: Let C be its acceptance condition and let a be the 
following proposition: 
(a) There exists a rational community S such that, for every 
proposition p, S satisfies C for either p or the denial of p.  
Then: Necessarily, if there is a rational community that satisfies C with 
respect to a, then a is true. 
The first assumption isn’t wholly uncontroversial; but I assume it will be granted by most 
naturalists. After all, naturalism typically (though not necessarily) goes hand- in-hand with 
atheism, and atheists are typically prepared to admit that there might have been nothing at all.  
Regarding SC, the idea is roughly just that only a being ideally situated with respect to every 
proposition would be in an ideal position to evaluate a proposition like a. A less-than- ideally 
situated being (e.g., a being very much like one of us) might have less-than- ideal evidence for 
either a or its denial. But having ideal evidence in favor of a would guarantee it’s truth (since 
ideal evidence must be infallible), and having ideal evidence against a seems to be impossible 
(since, plausibly, only a being ideally situated with respect to every proposition could infallibly 
rule out the truth of something like a). 
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Given these two assumptions, the second premise can be defended as follows. Let EC 
below be any true ETE (if such there be); let C be EC’s acceptance condition; let a, b, and g be 
propositions as follows: 
(a)  There exists a rational community S such that, for every proposition p, S satisfies 
C with respect to either p or its denial.  
(b) There exists a rational community that satisfies C with respect to a.  
(g)  There exists a rational community that both satisfies C with respect to a and 
accepts a.  
We then have: 
(EC) Necessarily: p is true º if there were a rational community that satisfied 
condition C with respect to p, then there would be a rational community 
that both satisfies condition C with respect to p and accepts p. (Premise) 
(6.1) Necessarily: a is true º if b  were the case then g would be the case. (From 
EC, by substitution)  
(6.2) b Þ a (From SC)  
(6.3) Necessarily: a. (From 6.1, 6.2) 
6.1 and 6.2 together entail 6.3 on the assumption that the correct modal system is S4 or 
stronger and that the correct semantics for counterfactuals guarantees that (i) a counterfactual 
conditional implies its corresponding material conditional, and (ii) a strict conditional implies its 
corresponding counterfactual conditional. 30 But from 6.3, it is a short step to the conclusion that, 
necessarily, there exists an omniscient community. 6.3 implies that it is necessarily true that 
there exists a rational community S such that, for every proposition p, S satisfies C with respect 
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to either p or its denial.  But this in conjunction with EC implies that it is necessarily true that, 
for every true proposition p*, there is a rational community that both satisfies C with respect to 
p* and accepts p*.  Hence, it follows that, necessarily, there is a rational community that accepts 
a proposition that tells the whole truth about whatever world is actual. 31 Thus, necessarily, there 
exists an omniscient community. Moreover, if one is willing to grant that the correct modal 
system is S5, then 6.3 implies that there exists a necessarily existing rational community. Again, 
6.3 implies that it is necessarily true that there exists a rational community; but, on the 
assumption that it is possible that there be no contingently existing beings, it follows that there is 
a possible world w that contains a rational community but no contingently existing rational 
beings. Thus, w must contain a necessarily existing rational community. But this implies that 
there in fact exists a necessarily existing rational community.32  
If this argument is sound, then pragmatic theories of truth entail that (a) necessarily there 
exists an omniscient community, and (b) there exists a necessarily existing rational community. 
This isn’t quite theism, but it is close. Theists, of course, will not be bothered by this conclusion, 
for their view already entails it and (typically) is motivated by considerations independent of a 
commitment to an epistemic account of truth. Naturalists, on the other hand, ought simply to 
reject epistemic accounts of truth; hence, they ought also to reject pragmatic theories of truth. 
However, as we have already seen, naturalists who reject a pragmatic theory of truth must either 
embrace theism or give up belief in objective moral properties. Assuming, as I have been, that 
belief in God is not justified by the methods of science, the first alternative is unavailable (short 
                                                                                                                                                             
30 For proof, see Rea 2000: 296 or Rea 2002: 152. 
31 Or, if there is no such proposition, then at least this much follows:  necessarily, for any true proposition that 
approximates telling the whole truth about the world, there is a rational community that accepts it. 
32 Here are the steps: Let W be a world with no contingently existing rational beings and let E1 - En be the members 
of the rational community that exists in W. We then have:  
(1) ~P Þ ~P [provable in the S5 modal system] 
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of giving up naturalism). Thus, we reach the main conclusion of this paper: naturalists must give 
up moral realism.    
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) ~ (E1 - En exist.) 
(2) Therefore: ~(E1 - En exist.) 
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